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SUMMARY OF DEFENDANT'S POSITION 
Appellee's brief contains a possible mischaracterization of Defendant's 
knowledge of the tape recording that was produced through "wiring" the confidential 
informant, Joseph Grimaud, in its statement, "Defendant concedes that he was aware of 
the existence of the tape because it was mentioned in one of the police reports provided 
by the prosecutor." Br. Appellee 6, 10. 
Defendant Borgogno's present counsel became aware of the tape through 
reading the police report provided to him as part of the trial record. Present counsel has 
no idea when Defendant or Defendant's trial counsel became aware of the tape because 
the record contains only one link between the tape and defense counsel, the questions 
asked at trial (R. 174-5, discussed in Br. App. 27-28). However, we contend that prior 
counsel should'have been aware of the tape, because it was mentioned in the police report 
and was mentioned at trial, and we further contend that his failure to inquire specifically 
about the tape was ineffective assistance of counsel. 
To the Defendant, the contents of the tape are not speculation. The 
Defendant knows what happened at his automotive shop the night of his arrest, and he 
knows that the tape must reflect the truth. He knows that the tape would have impeached 
the testimony of Grimaud, and would have bolstered the testimony given by Jack 
Henwood and Officer Niesporek. He knows, therefore, that the tape is exculpatory and 
would have exonerated him. The record shows that he tried to ask the court directly 
about the tape, but was directed by Judge Dever to talk that over with his counsel (R. 
170), who evidently did nothing further concerning the tape. 
A "Catch 22" exists here. The State argues that the Defendant cannot rely 
upon the contents of the audiotape since the audiotape is not part of the record. 
Defendant's trial counsel did nothing to make the audiotape a part of the record. The 
opportunity to make the audiotape a part of the record was lost once the immediate post-
trial period passed. Failure of Defendant's trial counsel to make the audiotape a part of 
the record constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The State contends, however, 
that the Defendant cannot claim ineffective assistance because the tape is not part of the 
record. The argument goes in circles. 
The solution seems to be that one must realize that the tape was referred to 
in the record, in the police reports attached to the State's discovery response, and was 
therefore incorporated in the record by reference. It could have been an integral part of 
the Defendant's defense if the proper steps had been taken by his counsel. 
Justice and fairness demand that when an accused's appointed counsel has 
not taken the steps necessary to protect him (i.e., compel production of the tape, listen to 
the tape, make post-conviction motions for relief based on failure to produce exculpatory 
evidence), protection must be available at the appellate level. Otherwise, the Defendant is 
forever doomed to live with the consequences of inadequate representation. The 
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Defendant has met the requirements established by case law to enable him to raise this 
issue at the appellate level. Br. App. 24-25. 
Appellee's position that defense counsel should have made an appointment 
to listen to the aural evidence (Br. Appellee 8) is a concession that defense counsel 
inadequately represented the Defendant. Appellant makes the additional claim, however, 
that since five months had passed since the recording of the tape, the prosecution had 
ample time to have the tape transcribed, and that transcription should have been furnished 
to the Defendant. Failure to have the tape transcribed in nearly half a year's time appears 
to be lack of diligence-almost a ruse by which the prosecution hoped to prevent the 
Defendant from availing himself of the exculpatory evidence (although present counsel 
knows the Tooele County Attorney's Office well enough to know that no such tactic 
would be deliberately employed; it is most likely that the tape was put away and 
forgotten, to the Defendant's detriment). 
The Defendant cannot be held responsible for the fact that neither the tape 
nor its transcript appear in the record, since his counsel failed to take the steps necessary 
to assure that they were in the record. The record is clear that the Defendant's trial 
attorney did not make a formal discovery request, file a motion to compel, make 
arrangements to listen to the tape, or make motions concerning voir dire. Had he done so, 
those instruments would be listed in the record. Their conspicuous absence makes just as 
concrete a statement as would their presence. 
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The absence of a record as to counsel's actions is every bit as eloquent as 
the presence of a record would be. The facts that counsel did not make a motion to 
compel, did not request or order a transcript of the tape, did not make motions concerning 
voir dire, are demonstrated by the lack of these motions in the record; this void 
substantiates Defendant's claims of ineffective counsel. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ X day of July, 1998. 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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